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Reinstatement As A Remedy For A
Pennsylvania Employer's Breach Of A
Handbook Or An Employment Policy
Kurt H. Decker, Esq.*
I. Introduction
Anyone seeking symmetry and clearly discernbile legal patterns
will not find it in employment law. Employment law is a bewildering
maze of conflicting statutes, common-law doctrines, contract-estab-
lished rules, and administrative agency edicts. Even within a narrow
area, the law can vary considerably, depending on whether an ad-
ministrative agency or a court is involved.
The conflict between employee and employer lies at the heart of
our economic system and social structure. Consequently, employ-
ment law may be among the most political of legal areas. Histori-
cally, laws and court decisions in this area have reflected the shifting
balance of economic forces between employee and employer.' Today,
the area of at-will employment is witnessing these changes as unions
enter a period of retrenchment.2
The at-will employment relationship allows either employee or
employer to terminate employment at any time, for no reason.3 Re-
cently, courts and legislatures have created certain exceptions to this
traditional relationship. Generally, these exceptions arise out of pub-
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I. For discussion of the labor movement within the United States see C. MORRIS, I
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1-66 (2d ed. 1983).
2. See Huge & McCarthy, Collective Bargaining in the 1980's-Comments and Ob-
servations, I HOFSTRA LABOR LAW FORUM 23 (1983).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) refers to at-will employment as
follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and
to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon
notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may termi-
nate by lapse of time or by supervening events. Id.
lic policy considerations4 and rest on the assumption that an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every employment
relationship whether it is founded on an oral or written contract.5
Despite wide-spread criticism,6 some jurisdictions still remain faith-
4. One exception concerns violations of "public policy". Public policy violations in-
clude the firing of an employee for: (1) declining to commit perjury at the employer's behest;
(2) refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme; (3) serving on a jury; (4) filing
workers' compensation claims; (5) refusing to take a lie detector test in a state prohibiting its
administration; (6) mislabeling packaged goods; (7) avoiding payment of commissions; and (8)
avoiding payment of a pension. Courts in at least eighteen jurisdictions have recognized a
judicially created public policy exception to at-will employment. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist. 98
Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,, 74 111.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v.
City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186
(1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, No. 81-CA-2460--MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12,
1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Siles v. Trave-
nol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (1982); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Henderson v. St. Louis Hous. Author., 605 S.W.2d
800 (Mo. 1979); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); McCullough v. Certain Teed Products
Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 23, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Krystad
v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 817, 400 P.2d 72 (1965); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978).
Courts in at least nine states and the District of Columbia indicate that they might adopt
the public policy exception to at-will employment under appropriate circumstances. Larsen v.
Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268
Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465,
590 P.2d 513 (1978); Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Abrisz v.
Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont.
1980); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); K.W.S. Mfg., Inc.
V. McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. Appl. 1978); Jones v. Keough, 137 Vt. 562, 409
A.2d 581 (1979); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis.2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Six jurisdictions have expressly rejected a judicially created public policy exception to at-
will employment. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Catania v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So.2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Goodroe v. Georgia Power
Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d
874 (Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lamaprt Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, appeal
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whitaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395
(Tenn. 1981).
5. See e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
6. It is apparent from recent commentary that at-will employment has become the
labor relations topic for the 1980's. See generally C. BAKALY. JR. & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: FORMATION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH
(1983) [hereinafter cited as BAKALY & GROSSMAN]; M. DiCHTER & A. GROSS, THE EMPLOY-
MENT-AT-WILL ISSUE (1982); H. PERRIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(1984) [hereinafter cited as PERRITT]; Berger, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dis-
missals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981); Bowers & Clarke, Unfair Dismissals and Managerial
Prerogative: A Study of Other Substantial Reason, 10 INDUS. L.J. 34 (1981); Decker, At-Will
Employment in Pennsylvania - A Proposal for its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87
DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983) [hereinafter cited as At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania];
Decker, At-Will Employment: A Proposal for its Statutory Regulation, I HOFSTRA LABOR
LAW FORUM 187 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Decker]; Decker, Federal Regulation of At-Will
Employment, 61 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 351 (1984); Flaxman, Employment Manuals in Penn-
sylvania: Contract or Unenforceable Gratuity, 21 THE PHILA. LAW. 1 (October, 1984) [herein-
after cited as Flaxman]; St. Antoine, The Right Not to be Fired Unjustly, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS
32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine]; Summers, Protecting All Employees Against
ful to this employment concept.7 Pennsylvania courts have reviewed
challenges to the at-will employment relationship numerous times.8
Unjust Dismissal, 58 HARV. Bus. REV. 132 (1980); Weisburst, Guidelines for a Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-At- Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L.
REV. 617 (1981); Comment, The Employment-at-Will Rule: The Development of Exceptions
and Pennsylvania's Response, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 477 (1983); Note, Non-Statutory Causes of
Action for an Employer's Termination of an 'At Will' Employment Relationship: A Possible
Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 743 (1979); Note, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employ-
ment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Role of Federal Courts]; 112 LAB. REL. REP. "News and Background Information"
148 (February 21, 1983).
7. See Supra note 4.
8. In the ten years since Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d
174 (1974), seven Pennsylvania appellate courts and four lower courts have decided wrongful
termination cases. All credit Geary with establishing a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
One court has held that an employment manual may constitute an implied contract. Another,
in effect, has introduced a requirement of just cause for termination of employment. See Sacks
v. Com., D.P.W., 501 Pa. 201, 465 A.2d 981 (1983) (public employment); Cisco v. United
Parcel Service, 328 Pa. Super. 300, 476 A.2d 1340 (1984); Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp.,
- Pa. Super. , A.2d - , 116 L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 3110 (1984); Richardson v.
Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa. Super 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983); Yaindle v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980); Hunter v. Port Auth., 277 Pa. Super.
4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980) (public employment); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Cuccaro v. United States Steel Corp., 131 Pitt. L.J. 534
(1983); Grundon v. Defense Activities Fed. Credit Union, 33 Cumb. Co. L.J. 529 (1983); and
Butler v. Negley House, Inc., 129 Pitt. L.J. 350 (1981). Federal Courts in Pennsylvania have
resolved wrongful termination cases at least thirty-seven times since Geary. In contrast to the
five out of seven state cases recognizing an action, the federal courts have upheld a cause of
action for wrongful termination only nine times. The following cases have dismissed wrongful
termination actions or granted summary judgment for the defendant: Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave-
nue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment claim preempted by statutory rem-
edy); Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (termination
allegedly because of physical handicap that did not affect job performance); Bonham v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (age discrimination), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
821 (1978); Adams v. Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (implied contract and
public policy claims); Ruch v. Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (alleged breach of terms of personnel manual); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F.
Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (sexual harassment claim preempted by statutory remedy); Harri-
son v. Fred S. James, P.A., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (alleged breach of implied
contract); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (termination for
refusing to drive overloaded trucks; motion to dismiss allowed, but plaintiff given leave to
amend complaint); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (termina-
tion for refusing to participate in price fixing); Wood v. Burlington Indus., 536 F. Supp. 56
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (alleged oral contract for permanent employment); Boreson v. Rohm & Haas,
526 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (termination for unsatisfactory performance), aff'd, 729
F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984); Huff v. County of Butler, 524 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (ter-
mination for alleged sexual harassment); Fleming v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 917
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (alleged termination for disclosing embezzlement); Moorhouse v. Boeing Co.,
501 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980) (alleged oral contract for
permanent employment); Rogers v. International Business Machines Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (termination contrary to employee manual); Lekich v. International Business
Machines Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (bad faith); Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd mem., 609 F.2d 500 (1979) (discharge contrary to
personnel manual); Walker v. University of Pittsburgh, 457 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(termination allegedly for exercising right to free speech); O'Neill v. A.R.A. Servs., Inc., 457
F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (termination in bad faith and contrary to public policy); Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (age discrimination); Geib v. Alan Wood
Steel Co., 419 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implied contract); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (public policy and first amendment); Green v.
Medford Knitwear Mills, 408 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implied contract). The following
The rise of handbooks and employment policies contribute to
the erosion of the at-will employment relationship.9 Employers use
handbooks and employment policies to communicate with employees
on a variety of subjects, including work rules, discipline policies,
wages, and fringe benefits. Courts increasingly consider these em-
ployer communications to be binding commitments."l As a result of
these developments, remedies take on added significance. Reinstate-
ment to an employee's former position is one remedy that deserves
more serious consideration.
Historically, the reinstatement remedy has generally been un-
available.1" In certain instances, however, courts have ordered rein-
statement in wrongful termination cases.12 Such decisions are consis-
tent with arbitrator awards of reinstatement for unjustified
terminations under collective bargaining agreements.13 If handbooks
and employment policies can be considered binding employer com-
mitments, then they may be similar in effect to collective bargaining
agreements. Handbooks and employment policies frequently address
the same topics as collective bargaining agreements. Consequently,
employers should timely review their handbook and employment pol-
icies in order to limit their liability for reinstatement of discharged
employees.
This article will discuss handbooks and employment policies, re-
instatement as an appropriate remedy for an employer's breach of a
handbook or an employment policy, and limitations on employer lia-
bility for reinstatement under a "fairness" rationale. The article will
also examine the Pennsylvania courts' recognition of reinstatement
as a remedy for wrongful discharge.
II. Handbooks and Employment Policies
An employer negotiating with a union over the terms and condi-
federal cases have recognized wrongful termination actions: Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (public policy and implied contract); Perks v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (termination on basis of polygraph test); Karr v.
Township of Lower Merion, 582 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (public policy); Rettinger v.
American Can Co., 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (termination because of disability and
filing of worker's compensation claim); Molush v. Orkin Extermination Co., 547 F. Supp. 54
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (termination on basis of polygraph test); Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp.
49 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (alleged hiring for reasonable time); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. I I I (E.D. Pa. 1979) (termination for refusing to participate in price fixing); Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (termination contrary to employment man-
ual); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (rationale unrelated to
Geary reasoning). See Note, The Role of Federal Courts, supra note 6 at-fns 126, 142.
9. See infra notes 35 and 47.
10. See infra note 35.
I1. See, e.g., 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 499-
500 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FAIRWEATHER].
12. See, e.g., Duhon v. Slickline, Inc., 449 So.2d 1147 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
13. FAIRWEATHER, supra note II at 499-500.
tions of a collective bargaining agreement recognizes that agreement
as an enforceable contract. Consequently, the employer is very care-
ful about what rights it gives to the unionized employees and what
rights it retains. However, many employers of nonunion employees
attempt to maintain considerable unilateral discretion and view the
statements in their handbooks and employment policies as general
guidelines, subject to withdrawal, modification, exceptions, or inter-
pretation at any time by the employer.1" Recently, many of these
employers have been unpleasantly surprised to discover that courts
are now consistently upholding these statements as binding commit-
ments that may imply other rights as well. 15 Consequently, employ-
ers should treat their handbooks and employment policies as they
would collective bargaining agreements, i.e., as binding and enforce-
able commitments.'" An aggressive strategy of this nature may bene-
fit employers of nonunion employees. For example, employers may
defer union organizing by making employees aware that the em-
ployer regards its policies as binding.' 7 Employees may not feel a
need for collective bargaining agreements or union representatives if
they are protected by enforceable employment policies. Employers
can render labor organizations innocuous if the terms and conditions
of the handbook or employment policy equal or exceed what employ-
ees could hope to gain from a collective bargaining agreement, and
the employees perceive the provisions as fair. Employee reliance
upon these provisions, however, may pressure courts to adopt a rein-
statement remedy when an employer discharges an employee in vio-
lation of the employer's own stated policies. Employers should antici-
pate and prepare for this possibility.
A. Handbooks and Employment Policies Generally
As employers became larger, well developed systems of rules be-
came necessary for the orderly and efficient functioning of the work-
place. 18 Several authorities have observed that:
At any one time, the rights and duties of workers and of
managers, indeed of all those in the hierarchy, must be estab-
lished and understood by all those involved in the hierarchy
... . The industrial system creates an elaborate "government"
14. See infra note 47.
15. See infra note 35.
16. See Reviewing the Employee Handbook, HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (C.C.H.) No.
61 (March 23, 1984).
17. Handbooks guaranteeing job protection counteract the primary motivation for em-
ployee unionization. Employers should not underestimate the value to employees of job secur-
ity and the power to appeal employer-determinations. See St. Antoine, supra note 6 at 35.
18. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS 7 (1977).
at the work place and work community. It is often said that
primitive societies have extensive rules, customs, and taboos, but
a study of the industrial society reflects an even greater complex
and a different set of detailed rules. 9
Small employers usually operate with few, if any, formal rules.
When the work force is small, activities can be individually di-
rected.20 For larger employers, however, individualized decision-
making becomes impractical. Increased size multiplies the number of
required employment decisions beyond the ability of one person to
make them. 21 Delegation of decision-making authority to lower-level
employees creates a risk of inconsistency and lack of precedent.22
Accordingly, large employers promulgate formal rules to manage op-
erations, procurement, capital investment, accounting, and public re-
lations functions. Policies control supervisory discretion regarding
time off, compensation, other benefits, promotions, and disciplines.23
Formal rules also explain policy to employees and reduce the num-
ber of individual unilateral decisions.
Handbooks and employment policies standardize employee pro-
duction and provide standards for employer instructions, thus avoid-
ing the inconsistency of individual supervisors. To be effective, how-
ever, they must be applied consistently and uniformly so that
predictability and order are maintained. 2 Handbooks and employ-
ment policies may also increase employee morale. By reducing the
opportunity for arbitrary supervisory action, they enhance the em-
ployees' perception of employer fairness.2 5 When used with internal
procedures for appealing adverse supervisory actions, they may pro-
mote the perception that employees are treated with respect and
concern.
26
Handbooks and employment policies usually outline: (1) rules of
expected employee behavior; (2) disciplinary or termination proce-
dures if those rules are violated; (3) compensation; and (4) benefit
items regarding hours of work, overtime, lay-off, recall, health care
insurance, pensions, leaves of absence, holidays, vacations, etc.
19. C. KERRY, J. DUNLOP, F. HARBISON, C. MYERS, INDUSTRIALISM AND INDUSTRIAL
MAN 41 (1960).
20. Perrit, supra note 6, at 306.
21. Id. at 306-307.
22. Id. at 307.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 309.
25. Id.
26. Id. To deal with the erosion of the at-will employment relationship, many employ-
ers have adopted dispute-resolution systems that range from the very informal to systems as
formal as those in collective bargaining agreements. These systems are commonly referred to
as : (I) open door; (2) formal appeal to management; and (3) arbitration. For an in-depth
discussion of these systems see BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 6 at 169-179.
Often, they are the only medium in which the employer sets forth
these statements. Handbooks and employment policies are commonly
intended to create a closer relationship between an employer and its
employees by opening, establishing, and maintaining a communica-
tion network. For this reason, handbooks and employment policies
are not exactly alike, but reflect each employer's particular opera-
tional and managerial style.
Today's handbooks and employment policies must reflect the
current applicable law. 21 Statutes regulating overtime, vacation pay,
and jury duty, for example, may vary from state to state.28 Therefore
employers must regularly review their policies to ensure compliance.
Careful evaluation will help to limit potential liability for improper
payments and to minimize overall liability for wrongful employer
actions.
B. The Status of Handbooks and Employment Policies Nationally
1. Written Handbooks and Employment Policies/Binding
Contracts.-For years, courts did not depart from the traditional
view that handbooks and employment policies did not affect the em-
ployee's "at-will" status. 9 Such policies were considered to be unen-
forceable unilateral employer expressions lacking definiteness, mutu-
ality, and consideration.3 0 Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Company,3 characterized this perception. In Johnson, a handbook
provision provided that termination could not occur without "just
cause." 32 The employee argued that this handbook provision created
27. State legislatures have provided some protection for at-will employees. For exam-
ple, several state statutes prohibit discharges based upon political activity. See, e.g. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975). For a collection of state laws regarding discharges
because of political activity, see [1984] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State. Laws) 1 43,045. Some
states prohibit discharges on the basis of physical handicaps. See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE
12940(a) (West Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie Law. Co-op 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West Supp. 1981). Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan,
North Dakota, and Vermont forbid employers from taking action against employees for serv-
ing as jurors or for indicating their availability as jurors. For a collection of state laws regard-
ing termination for serving on a jury see [1984] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (State Laws) 1 43,035.
Other states, for example, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Or-
egon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington prohibit termination of an employee who
refuses to take a lie detector test. For a collection of the state laws see [1984] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) (State Laws) 43,055. Another common provision in state laws is a prohibition
against retaliatory termination against an employee who files a worker's compensation claim.
See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch. 3 (1966); Bonfield, The
Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation P" Employers, 61 NW. U. L.
REV. 907 (1967).
28. See supra note 27.
29. See infra note 47.
30. Id. See Flaxman, supra note 6 at 10.
31. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
32. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes "just cause," see infra notes 175-177 and
accompanying text.
an express or implied contract. The court disagreed and concluded
that the provision was only the employer's unilateral expression of
policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the par-
ties and any benefits conferred by its were mere gratuities. No meet-
ing of the minds occurred through the employer's unilateral publish-
ing of this policy. 33 For many years, other courts adhered to this
rationale.3'
Today, however, courts increasingly are finding that statements
in handbooks and employment policies may create binding employer
commitments.3" For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Michigan,36 an employee was told at the time of hiring
that he would be employed as long as he did his job. This promise
was supported by a handbook provision stating that it was the em-
ployer's policy to terminate employees for "just cause" only.37 The
court held that these oral and written promises were enforceable as
33. Id. at 782.
34. See infra note 47.
35. Handbooks and employment policies have been found in certain circumstances to
be binding contractual commitments in the following states: Arizona: Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hospital, 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Arkansas: M.B.M. Co., Inc. v.
Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W. 2d 681 (1980); California: Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Colorado: Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group,
684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); District of Columbia: Washington Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v.
Poindexter, 479 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1984); Florida: Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427 So.2d
361 (Fla. 1983); but see Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Idaho: Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977);
but see Service Employees Int'l Union Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 106
Idaho 756, 683 P.2d 404 (1984); Illinois: Carter v. The Kaskaskia Community Action Agency,
24 Ill. App.3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974); Kansas: Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585
F. Supp. 1260 (D. Kans. 1984); but see Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976); Kentucky: Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489
(Ky. Sup. Ct. 1984); Massachusetts: Garrity v. Valley View Nursing Home, Inc., 10 Mass.
App. 822, 406 N.E.2d 423 (1980); Michigan: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michi-
gan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Minnesota: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1983); Nebraska: Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215
Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Nevada: Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594,
668 P.2d 261 (1983); New Jersey: Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491
A.2d 1257 (1985); New Mexico: Vigil v. Arzola, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984); New York:
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982);
Ohio: Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio Ct. App.3d 211,
454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982); Oklahoma: Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976); Oregon: Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., Inc. 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356
(1978); Pennsylvania: Banas v. Matthews International, - Pa. Super. - , - A.2d
__ 116 L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 3110 (1984); Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1983); but see Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hospital, 320 Pa. Super.
106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983) Pet. for Allowance of Appeal granted March 7, 1984; South Da-
kota: Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Tennessee: Hamby v.
Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Washington: Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
Damage awards against employers in these cases can be substantial. See, e.g., Washing-
ton Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. Poindexter, 479 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1984).
36. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). See also infra notes 53-57 and accompa-
nying text.
37. Id.
either an express agreement or as a result of the employees legiti-
mate expectations based on the employer's representations.3"
The courts that follow Toussaint39 view the handbook or em-
ployment policy as the offer and the employee's work as the accept-
ance of a unilateral contract. 0 Consideration arises through the em-
ployee's continuation of work, although the employee is free to leave.
These courts characterize handbooks and employment policies as
unilateral employment offers that an employer may augment, mod-
ify, or even withdraw. 4 1 For instance, when an employer distributes a
new handbook or employment policy, the employer makes a new of-
fer of employment to the at-will employee.42 This new offer is limited
to the contents of the new handbook or employment policy and be-
comes effective on the date it is distributed. When a handbook or
employment policy is withdrawn, the new offer becomes effective on
the date the employer notifies the employee of the withdrawal. At-
will employees accept the new offer and provide consideration by
continuing their employment.4
Handbooks and employment policies have also been afforded le-
gal recognition by courts resolving unemployment compensation dis-
putes.44 In cases involving a terminated employee's right to unem-
ployment compensation, the employer in most states has the burden
of proving that the employee was terminated for a deliberate or will-
ful violation of an existing employer policy, 45 and is, therefore, ineli-
gible for benefits. Employers commonly establish the existence of
these policies by proving the distribution of a handbook or employ-
ment policy in which the rule is printed."' Ironically, in this situa-
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Brooks v. Transworld Airlines, 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Col. 1983); Arie v.
Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct, App. 1983); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d, 622 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668
P.2d 261 (1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982);
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Dew v. City of Flo-
rence, 279 S.C. 155, 303 S.E.2d 664 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 345 (1984).
40. See supra note 39.
41. This is unlike the situation in which a union contract prohibits an employer from
making unilateral changes without first bargaining with the union. In the union setting, if no
agreement is reached between the union and the employer, it is difficult for the employer to
institute change. See, e.g., Decker, Pennsylvania's Public Employee Relations Act (Act 195)
and Impasse - The Public Employer's Right to Make Unilateral Changes in Employment
Conditions, 86 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1981).
42. Recently, in Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a binding contract will be presumed to exist
anytime an employer makes a "typical distribution" of a handbook.
43. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1983).
44. See, e.g., James v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa. Commw.
230, 429 A.2d 782 (1982); Lingenfelter v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 58
Pa. Commw. 52, 426 A.2d 1307 (1981).
45. See supra note 43.
46. See supra note 43.
tion, it is the employer and not the employee who maintains that the
handbook or employment policy is a binding employment
commitment.
2. Written Handbooks and Employment Policies/Non-Binding
Contracts.-Some courts reject the argument that handbooks and
employment policies may bind the employer 47 and remain faithful to
the rationale of Johnson v. National Beef Packing Company,48 that
employment policies are unenforceable unilateral employer expres-
sions lacking definiteness, mutuality, and consideration.4 9 These
courts also suggest that the terminated employee might be in viola-
tion of his/her obligation to follow the complaint procedures set
forth in the handbook.50 They see the handbook's failure to establish
an employment policy governing termination as evidence that no
contractual offer was made to employees.5 1
3. Oral Employment Policies/Binding Contracts.-An em-
ployer's oral promises of continued employment can support a find-
ing of a binding commitment.5 In most cases permitting recovery,
the employer communicated a promise orally that was combined
with a handbook statement. The handbook statement usually pro-
vided that employment would be terminated only for cause or only
after exhaustion of certain procedures.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,53 and its
companion case, Ebling v. Masco Corp.,54 sufficient evidence was
presented to imply a contract based on assurance that termination
would occur for "just cause only. ' ' 55 In Toussaint, there were two
independent promises. Either was sufficient to bind the employer.
One was an oral promise while the other was contained in a hand-
47. Handbooks and employment policies have been found to be non-binding contrac-
tual commitments in the following states: Alabama: White v. Chelsea Industries, Inc., 425
So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Delaware: Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095
(Del. 1982); Indiana: Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975);
Louisiana: Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So.2d 637 (La. 1982); Maine: Terrio v. Milli-
nocket Community Hospital, 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Montana: Gates v. Life of Montana
Insurance Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); North Carolina: Roberts v. Wake For-
est University, 55 N.C. Ct. App. 430, 286 S.E.2d 120 (1982), pet. denied, 305 N.C. 586, 292
S.E.2d 571 (1982); Texas: Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1982).
48. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 47.
50. See Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 406 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978).
51. See, e.g., Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213
(1962) (complaint procedures merely policy guidelines for supervisors).
52. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981).
53. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text.
54. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
55. 408 Mich. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885 (1980).
book. 5a Regarding the oral promise, the court declared that:
When a prospective employee inquires about job security
and the employer agrees that the employee shall be employed as
long as he does the job, a fair construction is that the employer
has agreed to give up his right to discharge at will without as-
signing a cause and may discharge only for cause.57
Other cases support the finding that oral promises may become bind-
ing employer commitments.5" Sometimes a direct oral promise can
be established. For example, in Terrio v. Millinocket Community
Hospital,59 the employer's agent orally assured the employee that
she was secure in her job "for the rest of her life." The court held
that the employer was bound by this statement, declaring that "the
context of her long service in a position of substantial responsibility
. . . provided the critical evidentiary support for her contract
claim."' 0 Several other cases suggest that oral promises and hand-
books may support holding the employer bound, if viewed in light of
all the circumstances. 6' In Schipani v. Ford Motor Co.,6" the em-
ployee maintained that an oral agreement, personnel manual, poli-
cies, and employment practices constituted an implied employment
contract to age 65. The employee further argued that this implied
contract controlled over a signed written contract stating that em-
ployment was terminable at-will. The court held that whether the
written contract was altered by alleged oral and written assurances
was a question for the jury. 63 While an oral contract might be unen-
forceable under the statute of frauds,64 the doctrine of promissory
56. The court held that:
A provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be
discharged except for cause is legally enforceable ... [Sluch a provision may
become part of the contract either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a
result of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy
statements.
id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
57. Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
58. See, e.g., Wiener v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
59. 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977).
60. Id. at 138.
61. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I Cal. App.3d 443, 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724 (1980).
62. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
63. Id.
64. As a general rule, an oral contract for an indefinite term of employment is outside
the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Reynier v. Associated Dyeing & Printing Co., 116 N.J.L. 481,
184 A. 780 (1936). A contract for an indefinite period is an at-will contract, i.e., it may be
terminated by either party at any time and for any cause. Thus, the contract is capable of
being performed within one year, and is, therefore, outside the statute of frauds. See, e.g.,
Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545, 549, n.7 (N.D. I11. 1984). Addition-
ally, because the employee's death could terminate the contract within a year, some courts
hold that the contract could be fully performed within one year. See, e.g., Bussard v. College
of St. Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 224, 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (1972).
estoppel could still negate this employer defense.65
4. Oral Employment Policies/Non-Binding Contracts.-Other
courts have found that oral promises are insufficient to constitute
binding employer commitments.66 Griffith v. Sollay Foundation
Drilling, Inc.,6 7 for example, affirmed the traditional rule that a
promise of permanent employment created an indefinite hiring, ter-
minable at will. There, a former employee alleged breach of an oral
''permanent" contract after the employer terminated the employee
on grounds that his services were no longer needed. 68 The court held
that since the contract was not for a fixed term, and the employee
had not given specific consideration beyond the rendering of services,
the employment agreement was terminable at the will of either
party. 69
C. The Status of Handbooks and Employment Policies in
Pennsylvania
Until recently, the majority of Pennsylvania courts rejected any
contractual implications arising from handbooks and employment
policies. Beidler v. W. R. Grace, Inc.7 0 best expresses this view. In
Beidler, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the company's termination
procedures, claiming that the procedures constituted an implied con-
tract. The court rejected this argument, declaring that "failure to
adhere to company personnel policy does not create a cause of action
for breach of an employment contract. ' 1
The first indication that Pennsylvania courts might endorse the
contractual status of handbooks and employment policies appeared
in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Company.72 Novosel, a long-
term supervisory employee with an umblemished disciplinary record,
alleged that he was terminated because he refused to participate in a
company-sponsored lobbying effort to reform no-fault insurance. He
had also privately voiced his opposition to Nationwide's position on
this issue. Novosel contended that his termination was wrongful as
65. Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, -, 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11
(1981).
66. See, e.g., Haupt v. International Havester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App.3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984).
67. 373 So.2d 979 (La. App. 1979).
68. Id. at 981.
69. Id. at 982. Oral agreements to purchase stock have also been held insufficient to
bind the employer. See, e.g., Pinsof v. Pinsof, 107 Ill. App.3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (1982).
70. 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd without opinion, 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir.
1979). For a recent discussion of this area see Flaxman, supra note 6 at 10-11.
71. 461 F. Supp. at 1016.
72. 721 S.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), remanded, 118 L.R.R.M. 2779 (W.D. Pa. 1985). See
infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
contrary to public policy,73 and that the termination breached an im-
plied contract promising continued employment as long as his job
performance remained satisfactory. Ignoring all previous federal
court cases dealing with the enforceability of handbooks, the court
held that Novosel should be permitted discovery because the issue of
whether the parties had formed a complete contract was a jury ques-
tion. It indicated that a jury might find that an employer's policies
and procedures could constitute binding contracts.
Novosel was immediately challenged by the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court's decision in Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hos-
pital.7 There, the hospital fired its Director of Nursing. She argued
that the employee handbook constituted part of her employment con-
tract and established a definite tenure of employment. The Superior
Court rejected this contention:
Beidler v. W. R. Grace, Inc .... held that under Pennsyl-
vania law, failure to adhere to a company personnel policy does
not create a cause of action for breach of employment contract.
We agree with that holding.
Appellant's unilateral act of publishing its policies did not
amount to the 'meeting of the minds' required for a contract.
The terms of the handbook were not bargained for by the par-
ties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities ....
(citation omitted). In fact, the handbook was unilaterally revised
by appellant twice during appellee's employment.
[A]ppellee's employment was terminable at will by either
party. Therefore, appellant is not liable for breach of contract as
the result of appellee's discharge.
76
Richardson appeared to foreclose contractual claims based on
handbooks in Pennsylvania. Later, however, in Banas v. Matthews
International Corporation,77 another Superior Court panel decided
that an employee handbook was a contract for some purposes, but
not for others. Banas, an at-will employee of long-standing, was ter-
minated for using company materials to make a grave marker for his
nephew's grave. He claimed that this work did not violate the com-
pany's handbook, which permitted the use of company equipment
and waste material, with permission, for personal work.
The Banas Court carefully refused to overrule Richardson, but
73. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 902-903. In support of the latter claim, Novosel alleged that Nationwide's
"custom, practice or policy created either a contractual just-cause requirement or contractual
procedures by which defendant failed to abide."
75. 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084 (1983).
76. Id. at 108-09, 466 A.2d at 1085.
77. 116 L.R.R.M. 3110 (Pa. Super. 1984). The Superior Court granted en banc reargu-
ment which was heard in December, 1984. A decision is still pending.
indicated that the cases upon which it relied were of "doubtful
value." Banas distinguished Richardson by holding that:
[While] a manual cannot create a contract giving an at-will
employee a definite term (length) of employment, it is equally
clear that the content of the manual is not meaningless. We are
unwilling to conclude that "an employee handbook on personnel
policies and procedures is a corporate illusion, full of sound...
signifying nothing.""8
The court concluded that in the at-will employment context, the
employee manual is part of the employer's unilateral offer of em-
ployment. The employee supplies both acceptance of the offer and
consideration by performing the job.79 The court recognized the em-
ployer's continuing right to "augment, modify and even withdraw
the manual," stating that this then becomes a new offer of employ-
ment effective on the date the new manual is distributed. The em-
ployee, by continuing employment, accepts the new offer and pro-
vides consideration to support the contract.
80
Under Banas, the employment at-will concept is dramatically
altered: the employee has "tenure" since employment cannot be ter-
minated for any activity permitted by the employment manual.8"
While this does not provide specific employment length, it does af-
ford effective job protection as long as the employee performs satis-
factorily, and in accordance with the employer's policies and
procedures. 2
Ill. Reinstatement - A Remedy Especially Appropriate for a
Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of its Handbook or Employment
Policy
A. Reinstatement: Historical Application in Employment
Terminations
Reinstatement is commonly regarded as the restoration of an
employee to his/her former position after termination, layoff, leave
of absence, or strike. 3 Historically, courts have resisted granting re-
instatement [through a specific performance remedy against an em-
ployer] unless specifically permitted by statute.84 As late as 1936,
78. Id.
79. Id. See also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
80. Id. See also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
81. See Flaxman, supra note 6, at 11.
82. Id.
83. LABOR RELATIONS EXPEDITER (B.N.A.) 545 (1984).
84. See Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance, 49 N.C.L. REV. 1
(1961).
some courts held that reinstatement orders were unenforceable,85
since the common law did not permit specific performance of an em-
ployment contract, i.e., forcing an employee by court order to work
for a particular employer.86 Usually, the employee could claim only
damages for back pay or punitive damages.87
Several rationales developed in support of rejecting reinstate-
ment. First, a damage remedy was considered adequate to fully com-
pensate any wrong done by the employer.8 8 Thus, equitable interven-
tion through reinstatement was not required. Second, because the
employment relationship depended upon cooperation between em-
ployer and employee, or between the employee co-workers, the status
quo could not be restored.89 Third, no practical means existed to su-
pervise the employee's work to assure good performance.90 Finally,
under the mutuality of remedy theory, since an employer could not
obtain specific performance against the employee because this would
be involuntary servitude, an employee could not enforce a reciprocal
commitment where the employer became the slave of the employee. 91
Today, these four justifications are susceptible to closer scru-
tiny. The 1980's have witnessed the development of an almost philo-
sophical creed that, as part of general fairness in employment, at-
will employees should be accorded the same job protections as their
unionized counterparts for wrongful terminations.92 This philosophy
has intensified during recent years because of uncertain economic
conditions,93 unsteady interest rates,94 and fluctuating levels of exces-
85. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Bryand, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W.2d 749
(1936).
86. Id. at -, 92 S.W.2d at 751.
87. See, e.g., Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 123 Mich. App. 521, 332 N.W.2d
591 (1983); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983).
88. See North Am. Co. for Life, Acc. & Health Ins. v. Boiling, 275 Ala. 457, 156
So.2d 144 (1963); Masetta v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 159 Ohio St. 306,
112 N.E.2d 115 (1985).
89. Rautenberg v. Westland, 227 Cal. App.2d 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1964).
90. For example, in De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti 4 Paige Ch. 264, (N.Y. Ch. 1833), an
employer attempted to force a "primo basso" to perform a contract "to sing, gesticulate and
recite." The Chancellor, in denying specific performance, stated:
I am not aware that any officer of this court has that perfect knowledge of
the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in the auricular nerve
which is necessary to understand, and to enjoy with a proper zest the peculiar
beauties of the Italian opera . . . . There might be some difficulty, therefore,
even if the defendant was compelled to sing under the direction and in the pres-
ence of a master of chancery, in ascertaining whether he performed his engage-
ment according to its spirit and intent. It would also be very difficult for the
master to determine what effect coercion might produce upon the defendant's
singing, especially in the livelier airs . ...
Id. at 270.
91. In the employee situation, see Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6
CORN. L. REv. 235 (1921).
92. See Decker, supra note 6, at 189. This is, in part, attributable to shifting patterns
in employment.
93. News and Background Information, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 14 (Jan. 3, 1983).
sive unemployment, 5 problems affecting all employment sectors of
the economy. Under this philosophy, reinstatement as a remedy for
wrongful termination should not be denied outright, but should be
judged by the facts in each particular case. This approach comports
with the notion that the law needs to protect at-will employees who
do not possess bargaining power equal to that of their employers.98
Examining each request for reinstatement on its own merits il-
lustrates the shortcomings of the four traditional justifications for its
refusal. For example, where a job carries with it prestige, opportu-
nity for personal learning, special career development, or other
unique advantages, a damages remedy may be inadequate. An em-
ployee terminated from such a position may experience difficulty in
finding a comparable position even if he/she prevails in a wrongful
termination action. A slowing economy or the specialized nature of
the position may also present a hindrance. Moreover, since the em-
ployer and not the employee has committed the wrong, the wrong-
fully terminated employee should not be compelled to relocate to ob-
tain a comparable position. Damages are also inadequate when
termination carries with it connotations of unsuitability or incompe-
tence. A wrongful termination's lingering impact can injure the em-
ployee's career elsewhere. Damages rarely compensate for these
types of prospective injuries.97
Reinstatement should not be denied merely because some posi-
tions require close, harmonious working relationships. Not all em-
ployment relationships require an employee to work closely with
others. For example, professional employees and those doing
mechanical work frequently operate independently, and yet perform
satisfactorily. There are also other positions in which the employee's
performance does not require supervision, and in those situations, the
employee's disposition may not be a relevant indication of his/her
ability to do the job.
98
The mutuality argument holds that, since the employer could
not force the employee to work, the employee should not be permit-
94. News and Background Information, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 127 (Oct. 18,
1982).
95. News and Background Information, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 201 (Nov. 15,
1982).
96. Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired on an at-will ba-
sis. Another 22% are unionized and about 15% are federal or state employees. See U.S. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1979, at 427 (table 704) (union membership); id. at 392 (table 644) (total labor force); id. at
313 (table 509) (government employees).
97. In the area of employment discrimination, however, courts have found it appropri-
ate to award "front pay." Front pay, which is similar to back pay, is awarded to compensate
for relief going forward. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
98. See infra note 99.
ted to force his/her work on the employer. While facially fair and
reasonable, this argument denies a wrongfully-terminated employee
continued employment, and effectively rewards the employer by im-
posing liability only for money damages.
In the past, courts have denied restatement on the basis of the
foregoing justifications." Today, courts hardly seem justified in re-
fusing the remedy in all cases. Of course, if the employee would
deliver less than acceptable performance, a court would be justified
in refusing reinstatement. However, courts should not refuse it alto-
gether merely because problems exist in limited instances. Reinstate-
ment is a viable remedy in other areas of employment law, particu-
larly under state and federal statutes. Additionally, arbitrators have
many years of experience with the reinstatement remedy under col-
lective bargaining agreements.
B. Reinstatement: Statutory Exceptions
1. Federal Exceptions.-The most publicized statutory provi-
sions for reinstatement for wrongful termination are found in federal
civil service statutes 00 and the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 10' These statutory remedies are ordinarly administra-
tive, but may be judicially enforced.10 2 In many cases, the traditional
99. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 929-931 (1973). One commentator, however, disagrees that a
reinstatement remedy is appropriate for professional employees:
Although reinstatement may be offered as a possible remedy for the dis-
charged professional, it is not the optimum solution because of its potentially
self-defeating nature. Litigation between the parties to the action is likely to
cause anger and hostility, an atmosphere not conducive to good working relation-
ships. Further, forcing the employer to reinstate a discharged associate or junior
accountant often will mean simply that the employer will search for other causes
for discharge. These reasons might include fabricated charges of insubordination
or unsatisfactory performance of an unreasonably burdensome workload.
Most importantly, perhaps, the private employer should have the absolute
power to discharge an employee, particularly in the professional fields. In the
operation of the modern law or accounting firm, firm members interact con-
stantly, and this interaction would be impaired seriously by a requirement that
the employee be reinstated. Thus, even though the employer should not have the
right to discharge, because contract or tort theory will provide a recovery for the
employee, the employer should still have the power to do so. As under any con-
tract, it should be a matter of the employer's choice. The price of the power to
breach the contract is the damage incurred by the other party. Indeed, it is
hoped that compensatory and punitive damages may be sufficiently burdensome
to dissuade unethical conduct from the beginning.
Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Un-
ethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 837
(1975) (footnote omitted).
100. 5 U.S.C. 7513(a) (1982) (permits removal of federal civil service employees "only
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service").
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The National Labor Relations Board may order a
"reinstatement of employees with or without back pay" where employees have been termi-
nated. Id. at § 160(c).
102. For example, orders of the National Labor Relations Board compelling reinstate-
ment may be enforced by the courts. Id. at 160(e). See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,
justifications for denying reinstatement - possible supervisory con-
flict or problems in enforcing employer cooperation - have been
given little or no consideration. For example, in one case arising
under the NLRA, an employee was terminated after he challenged
his supervisor to a fight. 10 3 The court reinstated the employee, find-
ing that the employment relationship could be renewed if the judici-
ary insisted upon it.'04
Federal anti-discrimination laws 105 contain similar remedy pro-
visions, which may require an employer to hire an individual in the
first instance or to reinstate a terminated employee to prevent dis-
crimination. Likewise, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")'06
authorizes reinstatement of an employee who is terminated for
claiming minimum wage benefits.10 7 Other federal legislation re-
stricting the right to terminate and permitting possible reinstatement
include: (1) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA); 0 (2) the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance
Act;109 (3) the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973;11 ° (4) the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA);111 (5) the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974;112 (6) the Clean Air Act;" 3 (7)
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;" 4 (8) the Railroad Safety
Act; 15 (9) the Consumer Credit Protection Act; 1  (10) the Civil
389 U.S. 375 (1967).
103. NLRB v. Yazoo Valley Elec. Power Ass'n, 405 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1968).
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 & -3 (1982).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
107. Id. at §§ 215, 217 (1982). This has been taken to mean that reinstatement may be
a proper remedy. See Mitchell v. Robart De Mario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
108. Id. at §§ 651-678 (1982). See id. at § 660(c)(1) (prohibiting discrimination against
an employee for assertion of rights guaranteed under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act).
109. Pub. L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38
U.S.C.) See §§ 2021(a)(A)(i), 2021(a)(B), 2021(b)(1) (1982) (guaranteeing the right to re-
employment upon satisfactory completion of military service and prohibiting termination
"without cause" within one year after re-employment).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982). See id. at 5794 (requiring affirmative action to ad-
vance the employment of handicapped individuals by government contractors or
subcontractors).
I11. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in titles 5, 16, 18, 26 , 29 and 42 of
U.S.C.) See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1975) (prohibits terminating of employees to prevent
them from attaining vested pension rights).
I 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1982). See id. at § 5851 (prohibits terminating employees
who assist, participate, or testify, or are about to do same, in any proceeding to carryout
purposes of the Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
113. Id. at §§ 7401-7642 (1982) (as amended). See id. at § 7622 (prohibits terminating
employees who commenced, caused to commence, or testified at proceedings against employer
for violation of the Act).
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (as amended). See id. at § 1367 (prohibits termina-
tion of employees who institute or testify at a proceeding against the employer for violation of
the Act).
115. 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-444 (1982) (as amended). See id. at § 441(a), & (b)(l) (prohib-
its railroad company from terminating employees who filed complaints, instituted or caused to
Service Reform Act of 1978;1" and (11) the Jury System Improve-
ments Act of 1978.118
In cases decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,119 and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
("ADEA"),12 0 courts have not been reluctant to order reinstate-
ment.1 21 Reinstatement has been ordered under Title VII where an
employee was terminated for taking action to enforce the provisions
of Title VII, 122 for being married, 23 for being pregnant and unmar-
ried,1 24 and for being overweight.1 28 These court have assumed, with-
out discussion, that the presumption created by the Supreme Court
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,1 26 in favor of awarding back pay,
applies equally to awards of reinstatement.
1 27
Although courts may simply "order" the employer to reinstate
the employee, occasionally a court will fashion the relief more
be instituted any proceeding under or related to enforcement of federal railroad safety laws, or
testified, or are about to, at such proceeding; or who refuse to work under conditions they
reasonably believe to be dangerous.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982) (as amended). See id. at § 1674(a) (prohibits ter-
minating employees because of garnishment of wages for any one indebtedness).
117. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513 (1982). See id. at § 7513(a) (permits removal of federal
civil service employees "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service").
118. Pub. L. No. 95-572, 92 Stat. 2453 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.) See id. at § 1875 (prohibits terminating employees for service on grant or petit jury).
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1982) (as amended).
120. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34 (1982)).
121. Under Title VII, see, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 F. Supp. 675 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), affd, 475 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1972); Danner v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971). Recent examples include: EEOC v.
Eazor Express Co., 499 F. Supp. 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1980), affd, 659 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1981)
(employee's reinstatement at the position she would have had absent discrimination, at the rate
of pay she would have been earning, and with the same seniority benefits); Jones v. Trailways
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 642 (D. D.C. 1979) (reinstatement, back pay, attorney's fees, and $2,500
as compensation for humiliation and degradation); EEOC v. Lithographers & Photographers
Int'l Union, 412 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1975) (back pay, reinstatement, and retroactive senior-
ity rights). Under ADEA, see, e.g., Frith v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 611 F.2d 950 (4th Cir.
1979).
122. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
123. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
124. See, e.g., Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan.
1971).
125. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D. D.C. 1974).
For additional information, see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. See also Anderson
v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); Lowry v. Whitaker
Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd, 472 F.29 1210 (8th Cir. 1973).
126. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
127. For example, McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1976), involved a race discrimination action in which the lower court had held that the defen-
dant school board's policy of replacing outgoing teachers with new teachers of the same race
was racially discriminatory, but had also denied the plaintiff, a black teacher, either reinstate-
ment or back pay. No grounds were stated for these denials. The appellate court, noting that,
once discrimination had been proved, a presumption arose that the victim was entitled to rein-
statement and back pay, vacated and remanded for the district court to award the requested
relief unless it found extraordinary circumstances justifying its denial.
clearly. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,18 the airline's policy
conditioned the employment of stewardesses upon their agreement to
maintain a desired weight, or face disciplinary procedures including
termination. The plaintiff was terminated for weighing more than
her prescribed amount. The court distinguished prospective and com-
pensatory relief by issuing both negative and affirmative injunctions.
The negative injunction precluded any further discriminatory activ-
ity by the airline based on an employee's weight; the affirmative in-
junction required the airline to notify all stewardesses that the com-
pany's weight policy would no longer be enforced, to adjust its
employment procedures accordingly, and to offer immediate rein-
statement with full seniority to all terminated stewardesses."2 9
Upon a judicial determination that an employee covered by the
ADEA has been unlawfully discriminated against by an employer,
relief in the form of "judgments compelling employment, reinstate-
ment or promotion" may be granted where appropriate.' Com-
pelled employment may also provide relief under the ADEA for un-
successful applicants in cases involving wrongful refusals to hire on
the basis of age.' 3 '
Courts construing the various discrimination statutes have evi-
denced a reluctance to order reinstatement only in cases in which
prolonged litigation has engendered ill will, 3 2 and in which the em-
ployee has also received a substantial backpay award. For example,
in Cancellier v. Federated Department Stores,33 three former exec-
utives sued Federated, alleging that their terminations violated the
ADEA. They also alleged pendent state claims for breach of con-
tract and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. After a six week trial, the jury awarded a general verdict of
128. 374 F. Supp. 382 (D. D.C. 1974).
129. Id.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See, e.g., Frith v. Eastern Air Lines, 611 F.2d 950 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Babb v. Sun Co., 562 F. Supp. 491 (D. Minn. 1983), the court noted that
reinstatement is a favored remedy under the ADEA and should be denied only under "excep-
tional circumstances." Id. at 492. The employer urged that front pay in lieu of reinstatement
was a better remedy, especially since some acrimony may have developed during the course of
the litigation. The court rejected the argument, finding that there was no "poisoned relation-
ship" as a result of the litigation, and there was no other reason not to order reinstatement. Id.
at 493. All three plaintiffs were reinstated. One had unsuccessfully sought other employment;
one had secured employment, but with reduced benefits; and one had not sought other employ-
ment because he had few employable years ahead of him. Id.
131. Schultz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See also Dicker-
son v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983), in which the defendant-
employer denied plaintiff a job solely because of her age. The district court refused to compel
the defendant to hire her. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the job sought was
not so sensitive that hiring the plaintiff would engender antagonism, nor was there such ani-
mosity between parties that an amicable future working relationship would be impossible.
132. See supra notes 130 and 131.
133. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983).
$1,900,000, plus attorneys' fees and costs of $467,000.38 The court
refused to order reinstatement because of the acrimony between the
plaintiffs and their employer, and because the plaintiffs were "made
whole" by the size of the verdicts. 8 5
While courts have little difficulty in ordering reinstatement as a
statutory remedy, many courts are reluctant to extend this remedy to
at-will employment relationships. Lack of a statutory authorization
should not, however, preclude such relief. Employment is employ-
ment whether under statutory regulation or as part of an at-will em-
ployment relationship. To deny this is to perpetuate an illusory and
artificial distinction that no longer serves a viable purpose in today's
society.' 3 6
2. Pennsylvania Exceptions.-Within Pennsylvania the most
common statutory provisions permitting reinstatement for wrongful
termination occur in civil service statutes."'7 Civil service protection
exists for certain public employees at both the state' 38 and local
level. 13 9 Teachers are also provided protection from wrongful termi-
nation." ' The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (Act
134. Id.
135. The Court of Appeals explained that:
[T]he trial judge in this case denied reinstatement because he found evidence of
acrimony in the record and because he was "fully satisfied that [the verdict] has
made the plaintiffs whole . . ." (citation omitted). The court noted the testi-
mony of an I. Magnin officer who referred to plaintiff Ritter as a "cancer". I.
Magnin's numerous attacks during the trial on plaintiffs' ability support the trial
judge's conclusion that plaintiffs and I. Magnin could no longer "co-exist in a
business relationship that could be productive to the consumer, community or
the business itself."
Id. at 1319-20.
136. One commentator has noted that:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely depen-
dent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the
relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the
mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis in original).
137. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.950 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Pennsylvania
civil service employees). See also Baron v. Comm., State Civil Service Commission, 8 Pa.
Commw. 6, 301 A.2d 427 (1973). Civil service laws ensure employment, security, and protec-
tion for faithful and obedient public service, regardless of political affiliation, although civil
service status does not guarantee life tenure.
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 741.950 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
139. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46190 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Borough's civil
service police officers); Mancke, Removal, Suspension or Demotion of Municipal Police Of-
ficers: A Review and Analysis, 79 DICK. L. REV. 380 (1975).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ I1-1122 - 11-1127 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Teachers can
be terminated only for the causes enumerated in the Public School Code, e.g. intemperance,
and willful and persistent violation of school laws. Additionally, the Public School Code, ab-
sent a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of discharges, is the exclusive
195) "141 and the Police and Firemen's Collective Bargaining Act (Act
111)142 provide further protection for public employees, and specifi-
cally establish reinstatement as a remedy for wrongful discharge.
Both private and public employees can enforce reinstatement
for discriminatory discharge under the Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Act (PHRA) 43 and for termination for filing a claim under the
Workers Compensation Act. 44 The Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Act of 1937 ("PLRA") 4 5 offers private sector employees protection
similar to that provided under the National Labor Relations Act
(,,NLRA").'"
The reinstatement remedies under Pennsylvania statutes are or-
dinarily administrative in nature, 47 but may be enforced in the
courts."4 8 Significantly, Pennsylvania courts do not hesitate to order
reinstatement when such relief is governed by statute. 49 A similar
procedure by which a discharged tenured teacher may challenge the termination. For informa-
tion on discharges of non-tenured teachers, see, e.g., McKelvey v. Colonial School Dist., 35 Pa.
Commw. 264, 385 A.2d 1040 (1978) (temporary professional employee terminated by school
board without reasonable notice of a hearing and opportunity to be heard entitled to reinstate-
ment); see also Allegheny Intermediate Unit v. Jarvis, 48 Pa. Commw. 636, 410 A.2d 389
(1980).
141. Act of July 23, 1970, Pub.. L. No. 195-563 codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Act 195 granted all Pennsylvania public employees, except
police officers and fire fighters, the right to organize and bargain collectively.
142. Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 111-237, codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
217.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Act II established the right to organize and bargain collectively
for police officers and fire fighters. For cases dealing with reinstatement under Act 11, see
Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 460 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977); Local 302,
Internat'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Allentown, 55 Pa. Commw. 599, 423 A.2d 1119
(1980); Borough of New Cumberland v. Police Employees of New Cumberland, 51 Pa.
Commw. 435, 414 A.2d 761 (1980); Pennsylvania State Police, 13 P.P.E.R. 1 13011 (1981);
Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Police and Firemen, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 185 (1978).
143. Act of Dec. 27, 1965, Pub. L. No. 1225 (Codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 93, §§ 95-9 (Purdon Supp. 1985)). See id. at § 959(0.
144. Act of Dec. 28, 1959, Pub. L. No. 2034 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, §§ 7-7 (Purdon Supp. 1985)). See id. at § 751. See also, Rettinger v. American Can Co.,
574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (discharge because of disability and filing of worker's
compensation claim).
145. Act of June 1, 1937, Pub. L. No. 294-1168 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43 § 211.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985)). The Act permits reinstatement for private sector em-
ployees who are wrongfully terminated for exercising their rights to organize and bargain
collectively.
146. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
147. For example, the applicable civil service commission, see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, §§ 741.201-.212 (Purdon Supp. 1985), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB),
see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.501-.503 (Purdon Supp. 1985), the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (PHRC), see id. at §§ 956-957, and the Secretary of Education, see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1131 (Purdon Supp. 1985), are all charged by statute with the admin-
istration of the remedies discussed.
148. See, e.., Allegheny Intermediate Unit v. Jarvis, - Pa. Commw. - , 490 A.2d
959 (1985) (court enforcement of Secretary of Education's reinstatement order).
149. Reinstatement has even been ordered for a former employee who recovered from a
mental illness. See Dep't of Transp. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 263, 290 A.2d
434 (1972) (Civil Service Commission did not abuse its discretion in reinstating former em-
ployee where evidence showed great improvement in the employee's condition and the em-
ployee was able to resume employment); see also City of Harrisburg v. Pickles, - Pa.
result should obtain in cases arising out of traditional at-will employ-
ment. Artificial distinctions are no longer appropriate to separate a
statutory remedy from what is allegedly unavailable at common law.
C. Reinstatement: Current Status Under Wrongful Termination
Litigation
1. Throughout the United States.-Prior to the recent surge
of at-will employment litigation, 150 special situations arose under
which wrongfully-terminated employees were reinstated. 151 For ex-
ample, in Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Co., 52 a high-level execu-
tive employee had an employment contract which provided that the
employer could retire him if he became disabled. When the employer
decided that he was disabled and terminated his services, the em-
ployee invoked the contract's arbitration provision. The arbitrators
finding that the employee was not disabled, ordered reinstatement. 15 3
Recently, some courts with a renewed interest in the reinstate-
ment remedy have ordered it in wrongful termination cases. Duhon
v. Slickline, Inc.,' 54 involved a wrongful discharge suit by a father
against his sons. The sons testified that they terminated their father
for his failure to perform certain job duties. They also testified that
their father refused to do any sales work until one son shaved his
beard. 5"
The trial court found that the father was wrongfully terminated
and that the incidents upon which the sons relied to establish cause
for the termination were minor. 1' The appellate court affirmed the
lower court's finding's 57 declaring that:
Commw. -, 492 A.2d 90 (1985) (court remands case back to lower court to provide "rein-
statement" order).
150. See supra note 4.
151. See Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959). See also Colvig v. RKO General, Inc., 232 Cal. App.2d 56, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1965).
152. 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
153. Id.
154. 449 So.2d 1147 (La. App. 1984).
155. The father's employment contract provided in part that his services "to be rendered
are Chairman of the Board, Advisor, and items actually related thereto, including supervision
on jobs." Id. at 1149.
156. Id. at 1152.
157. The appellate court noted that:
[T]he plaintiff was hired primarily to supervise and advise, due to his expertise
and extensive experience in wireline work. Although the plaintiff stated that he
considered sales a part of his job duties, it appears that such work was not envi-
sioned as a primary function of the plaintiff when he signed the employment
contract. We find support for this proposition in the testimony regarding the
amendment of the contract at the time it was signed. At the insistence of Guy
Duhon, the contract was amended to show that supervision on jobs would be
considered a part of the plaintiff's job duties. This testimony evidences a concern
on the part of Guy Duhon with more precisely defining the plaintiff's job duties.
The absence of any mention of sale work leads us to believe that, if it was in-
A party who establishes a breach of his employment con-
tract due to a wrongful dismissal is entitled to either damages or
specific performance of the contract, or to dissolution of the con-
tract. In all these cases, the plaintiff is entitled to damages
where they accrue. Giron v. Housing Authority of City of Ope-
lousas, 393 So. 2d 1267 (La. 1981). There was no error in the
trial court's judgement ordering the specific performance of the
contract, nor in the award of back pay and benefits as damages
for the breach. "
Following this rationale, the court ordered the father reinstated to
his former position. 159
In Ellis v. Glover and Gardner Construction Co., 60 an em-
ployee who was terminated because his wages were being garnished
brought suit alleging that the termination violated the Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act. 6 ' The employer maintained that it ter-
minated Ellis because of alcoholism, poor job performance, insubor-
dination, and dishonesty. However, the separation notice stated:
This man was discharged do (sic) to his wages being garnishee
(sic)-it is a company policy to discharge any employee this
happens [to].62
Ellis sought reinstatement, backpay, and other relief. The court,
relying on past practice in the area of employment discrimination,
found reinstatement an appropriate remedy:
In the field of employment discrimination, ... by way of
analogy, reinstatement and back pay are required in order to
make the plaintiff whole for past injuries suffered as result of
the unlawful discrimination . . . . The employment discrimina-
tion cases under Title VII are instructive because, in the face of
rather vague statutory language, the courts have had to develop
a standard of discretion that will effectuate the legislation's pur-
tended that the plaintiff do sales work, such intention was not a primary consid-
eration in the negotiation of the employment contract. Thus, the defendants'
suggestion that the alleged failure of the plaintiff to do sales work constitutes a
blanket refusal to perform his duties is not supported by the record. It is also
important to observe that the plaintiff held a position of authority with Slickline,
Inc. While we may disagree with the position taken by the plaintiff on the issue
of his son's beard, the record makes clear that the plaintiff, by virtue of his
position, as entitled to have some input into policy-making, a function apparently
shared with his sons. Thus, the plaintiff's strong stand on the issue, in our view,
is not in the nature of insubordination, but rather a policy conflict with those
with whom he shared authority.
Id.
158. Id. at 1153.
159. Id.
160. 562 F. Supp. 1054 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
161. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 163-64 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1671-77 (1985)).
162. Id. at 1056.
poses . . . . To deny reinstatement and back pay in the instant
case would appear, to this Court, unjustifiable in light of Section
1674(a)'s central purpose of protecting a particular class of
debtor-employees from discharge by reason of garnishment. 63
Brockmeyer v..Dun & Bradstreet,64 offers additional support to
the argument that reinstatement is a viable remedy in wrongful ter-
mination actions. Brockmeyer held a management position as district
manager of the credit services division, but did not have an employ-
ment contract. His immediate superiors learned that Brockmeyer,
who was married but separated, was vacationing in Montana with
his secretary while he was supposed to be performing his duties. Ad-
ditional inquiries revealed that Brockmeyer had also smoked mari-
juana in the presence of company personnel. Supervisory personnel
confronted Brockmeyer, who acknowledged the relationship with his
secretary, and apologized for his absenteeism without notice. He also
admitted smoking marijuana but promised not to do it again. His
supervisors advised Brockmeyer that he would be terminated or reas-
signed if his performance did not improve.
Shortly thereafter, Brockmeyer's former secretary filed a sex
discrimination claim against the employer. Although his superiors
insisted that Brockmeyer submit a written report detailing the course
of events leading to the resignation, Brockmeyer refused, fearing he
would become Dun & Bradstreet's scapegoat for the alleged
discrimination.
Dun & Bradstreet settled the claim with Brockmeyer's former
secretary. Three days later the company terminated Brockmeyer, of-
fering him $8,500 to sign a release agreement not to sue.
Brockmeyer refused and initiated a wrongful termination action.
For the Brockmeyer court, availability of a reinstatement rem-
edy turned on whether the action sounded in tort or in contract:
Those cases implying a contractual term of good faith dealing
sounded in contract. Most, though not all of the public policy
exception cases from other states were tort actions . . . . The
most significant distinction in our view between the two causes
of action in wrongful discharge suits is in the damages that may
be recovered. In tort actions, the only limitations are those of
"proximate cause" or public policy considerations. Punitive
damages are also allowed. In contract actions, damages are lim-
ited by the concepts of foreseeability and mitigation. The reme-
dies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful dis-
charge statutes are limited to reinstatement and backpay,
163. Id. at 1066-67.
164. 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
contractual remedy concepts . . .[R]einstatement and backpay
are the most appropriate remedies for public policy exception
wrongful discharges since the primary concern in these actions is
to make the wronged employee "whole." Therefore, . . . a con-
tract action is most appropriate for wrongful discharges ....
The contract action is essentially predicated on the breach of an
implied provision that an employer will not discharge an em-
ployee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear man-
date of public policy. Tort actions cannot be maintained."'
Reinstatement is also available in common law tort actions as a
form of injunctive relief. 6 Although the availability of this type of
relief depends on a variety of factors, 67 it is likely that courts when
evaluating requests for reinstatement in public policy tort cases, may
apply the rules governing general tort actions to justify awards of
reinstatement in wrongful discharge cases. As the above cases sug-
gest, courts no longer refuse outright. Rather, courts look to facts in
each case to determine the appropriateness of reinstatement for
wrongfully terminated employees.
2. Within Pennsylvania.-In Geary v. United States Steel
Corp.,'"68 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to create an
outright nonstatutory cause of action for unjust or wrongful termina-
tions. The court did, however, acknowledge that "a discharge might
plausibly give rise to a cause of action where a clear mandate of
public policy is violated."' 9 Since Geary did not establish a cause of
165. Id. at 574-76, 335 N.W.2d at 841. For a later case affirming this result, see Jerry
Dvorak v. Pluswood Wisconsin, Inc., 121 Wis.2d 218, 358 N.W.2d 544 (1984), in which the
court stated:
Our decision in this case is consistent with Brockmeyer. In that case, our
supreme court held that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge only when the discharge is contrary to public policy. [113 Wis.2d at 572-
73, 335 N.W.2d at 840]. The supreme court reached this decision by implying a
public policy provision into all employment contracts. Id. at 574, 335 N.W.2d at
841. The supreme court concluded that a breach of the implied provision created
a contract action, rather than a tort action. Id. The court specifically rejected
the argument that a wrongful discharge can be maintained as a tort action; the
court held that contract damages, especially backpay and reinstatement, are the
appropriate remedies for breach of an employment contract.
121 Wis.2d at 220, 358 N.W.2d at 545-46.
166. Injunctive relief, encompasses both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 48, Note on Terminology (1977).
167. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936(l) (1977) listing the following
factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,(b) the relative adequacy to the
plaintiff of injunction and other remedies,(c) any unreasonable delay by the
plaintiff in bringing suit,(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plain-
tiff,(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is
granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,(f) the interests of third persons and of the
public, and(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
168. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
169. Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
action, the court refused his request for reinstatement.1 70
Recently, in Novosel v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 171 the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied
the employer's request for summary judgment on the issue of
reinstatement:
Neither party cites any cases which address the availability of
injunctive relief for the tort of wrongful discharge in implied
contract cases. Assuming arguendo that reinstatement is a le-
gally cognizable remedy, the Court will be better able to deter-
mine whether equitable relief is appropriate in the instant case
after both parties have presented the facts at trial.1
72
The court's willingness to gauge the suitability of reinstatement
on the facts, rather than refusing it outright, signals new hope for
wrongfully-discharged employees bringing suit in Pennsylvania.
D. Towards a Comprehensive Rationale for Awarding Reinstate-
ment for a Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of a Handbook or Em-
ployment Policy
Experience with the arbitration and the administrative remedies
arising under collective bargaining agreements suggests that rein-
statement is not unworkable for an employer's breach of a handbook
or employment policy. Collective bargaining agreements, like hand-
books and employment policies, include work rules, discipline poli-
cies, wages, fringe benefits, and rights and benefits accruing under
the agreement. Moreover, the employee's right to employment based
on the collective bargaining agreement is paramount to the individ-
ual employment contract.'
Most collective bargaining agreements require a "cause" or
"just cause" standard for termination or other disciplinary action.
Absent an express just cause provision in a collective bargaining
agreement, however, many arbitrators imply a just cause limita-
tion. 74 One justification for implying this standard is that:
If the Company can discharge without cause, it can lay off
without cause. It can recall, transfer, or promote in violation of
the seniority provisions simply by invoking its claimed right to
discharge. Thus, to interpret the Agreement in accord with the
claim of the Company would reduce to a nullity the fundamen-
170. Id. Since Geary, other wrongful termination plaintiffs have unsuccessfully sought
reinstatement in the Pennsylvania courts.
171. 118 L.R.R.M. 2779 (W.D. Pa. 1985) on remand from 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984).
See also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
172. 118 L.R.R.M. at 2782.
173. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
174. See, e.g., Cameron Iron Works, 25 LAB. ARB. 295 (1955).
tal provision of a labor management agreement - the security
of a worker in his job.
17 5
Arbitrator Joseph D. McGoldrick illustrated the significance of the
terms "cause" or "just cause" as follows:
There is no significant difference [among the] various phrases
["just cause," justifiable cause,' ''proper cause," or "cause"].
These exclude discharge for mere whim or caprice . . . . They
include the traditional causes of discharge in the particular
trade or industry, the practices which develop in the day-to-day
relations of management and labor and most recently they in-
clude the decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a
growing body of "common law" that may be regarded either as
the latest development of the law of "master and servant" or,
perhaps, more properly as part of a new body of common law of
"[m]anagement and labor under collective bargaining agree-
ments." They constitute the duties owed by employees to man-
agement and, in their correlative aspect, are part of the rights of
management. They include such duties as honesty, punctuality,
sobriety, or, conversely, the right to discharge for theft, repeated
absence or lateness, destruction of company property, brawling
and the like. Where they are not expressed in posted rules, they
may very well be implied, provided they are applied in a uni-
form, non-discriminatory manner.1 76
175. Atwater Mfg. Co. 13 LAB. ARB. 747, 749 (1949).
176. Worthington Corp. 24 LAB ARB. 1, 6-7 (1955). Absent precise definition, "cause"
or "just cause" may be any combination of the following factors:
(a) The "law of the shop" as to the particular offense; i.e., the response to
that offense developed over a period of years. Showing a consistent pattern of
viewing that offense in a certain manner, as requiring severe or less than severe
discipline;
(b) A consistent pattern of enforcement of rules and regulations and of
making known the rules to all employees;
(c) Case histories of other incidents of enforcement;
(d) Known practices of severe discipline for certain offenses because of the
product manufactured or safety consideration;
(e) Offenses call for immediate suspension and those not requiring removal;
(f) On-premises and off-premises offenses, and the differences in their
treatment;
(g) General "arbitral authority," derived from publication of awards, arti-
cles, etc.;
(h) The arbitrator's own sense of equity and his/her subjective judgment as
to the significance, seriousness and weight to be given the incident involved, the
record of the employee, or the circumstances causing the termination;
(i) The severity of the case's facts;
j) Attempts made to rehabilitate the employee by the employer;
(k) Progressive discipline steps that may or may not have been taken;
(I) The discipline penalty imposed as it relates to the case's facts;
(m) Whether a "second chance" is warranted from the employee's prior
record; or
(n) Whether the employee is unreclaimable as indicated by his/her prior
record, facts of the case; etc.
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Many collective bargaining agreements also contain "progres-.
sive discipline" clauses which impose a kind of procedural due pro-
cess through a series of disciplinary steps before an employee is ter-
minated. 17 Even if progressive discipline is not required explicitly,
collective bargaining agreements frequently enumerate "cardinal
sins" for which no prior warning is necessary before an employer
terminates the employee. Employees who commit lesser "sins" are
subject to progressive discipline. Among the most common "cardinal
sins" are dishonesty, insubordination, use of drugs or alcohol while
on duty, fighting, use of company vehicles without permission, and
possession of firearms on company property. Other misconduct of
equal magnitude will also justify termination for cause. 178
While lesser penalties involve warnings and suspensions, the ul-
timate penalty for wrongdoing is termination. Termination is the
most extreme industrial penalty because the employee's job, contrac-
tual benefits, and future employability are at stake. ' 79 However, in
termination cases, the employer usually bears the burden of proving
wrongdoing. The employer always has the burden if the agreement
requires just cause for termination. The quantum of required proof,
however, remains an unsettled issue.' 80
Reinstatement and back pay together constitute a major sanc-
tion for enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, state la-
bor relations acts, discrimination laws, and collective bargaining
agreements. Collective bargaining agreements enforced through ar-
bitration clauses are an almost universal part of the employer-union
relationship.' 8 ' Today, little doubt remains about the authority of an
arbitrator to direct reinstatement as the remedy for a wrongful ter-
mination.182 Additionally, arbitration awards are enforceable in the
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182. Arbitration is considered the substitute for industrial strife. It is part and parcel of
the collective bargaining process itself. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). As the Court then declared:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It
is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. See Shulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004 (1954). The collective
agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant. A collective bar-
gaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government.
The grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very
heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of dis-
courts. It is not surprising, then, that few remedies are as effective in
discouraging spurious or capricious terminations as reinstatement.
Employers know that, unless the discharge was justifiable, they may
face reinstatement as well as back pay orders in addition to the time
and expense of litigation. Often, reinstatement and/or a back-pay
bill constitutes a considerable sum.
Awarding similar remedies for wrongful terminations occuring
under handbooks or employment policies may dictate the same em-
ployer constraint. This may be especially appropriate in cases in
which the employer makes commitments, hence their analogy to col-
lective bargaining agreements.1 83 Furthermore, a "just cause" stan-
putes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning
and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement. The labor arbitra-
tor performs functions that are not normal or customary to the courts. The con-
siderations that help arbitrators fashion judgments may be foreign to the exper-
tise of experience of courts.
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a
public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the
parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer
justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of
a system of self-government created by and confirmed to the parties
Shulman, supra, at 1016.
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judg-
ment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as
criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular griev-
ance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequence to the moral of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the
arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of uninterrupted
production under the agreement to make the agreement serve their specialized
needs. A court cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because it cannot be similarly
informed.
363 U.S. 580-81. Similarly, in Mendelson v. Shrager, 432 Pa. 383, 385 248 A.2d 234, 235
(1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "settlements of disputes by arbitration
are no longer deemed contrary to public policy. In fact, our statutes encourage arbitration and
with our dockets crowded and in some jurisdictions congested, arbitration is favored by the
Courts."
183. See supra note 35. Throughout the remainder of the industrial world, reinstatement
is considered a viable remedy. The reports of the 10th International Congress of the Interna-
tional Society for Labor Law and Social Security indicate the following regarding employment
termination and reinstatement:
Most effective is the reinstatement of the employee. There may be various
terms used to identify this remedy. However, they all translate back into the
same idea: the discharge lacks all effect because the labor contract continues its
course.
We must differentiate between reinstatement and re-engagement. The latter
connotes the celebration of a new contract, with the effect that there exists a
lapse between the original and subsequent contracts. British legislation affords
both reinstatement and re-engagement as remedies.
There is an issue as to whether "restitution" may be equally accomplished
by reinstatement or simply by payment of the employee's salary notwithstanding
his absence. This problem has particular significance where an employer wishes
to discharge an employee for union activity. The employer may wish to continue
dard can also be implied and reinstatement ordered as an appropri-
ate remedy.
Pennsylvania courts and commentators reviewing at-will em-
ployment issues repeatedly overlook Trainer v. Trainer,184 in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as early as 1909, permitted recov-
ery for a wrongful termination based on a contractual theory.
185
In Trainer, an employee was hired to manage a spinning com-
pany. The facts make no reference to any written employment agree-
ment; only the corporate minutes and resolutions referred to the hir-
ing. The employee was terminated after differences arose between
the employee and some members of the corporation's board of direc-
tors. The employee sued to recover the balance of his salary for the
time that he was not permitted to continue as manager. A jury trial
resulted in a verdict that allowed recovery. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court upheld the jury's verdict indicating that "the jury could
very properly ...determine whether there was 'just cause' for the
discharge."' 186
Trainer is significant in several respects. First, it supports the
argument that a "just cause" requirement may be a prerequisite to
termination. Second, it is analogous to cases in other jurisdictions
allowing recovery for wrongful termination based on express and im-
plied contracts in policy books, handbooks, and personnel manuals,
payment of the employee's salary so long as that employee does not contact his
fellow workers. After vacillation somewhat, Italian law looks with disfavor upon
the attempt to force reinstatement. Obviously, what is sought is the effective
reinstatement of the worker and not simply the payment of a salary.
Small firms. Some laws have set forth that reinstatement is not available
against small firms (Peru and Sweden).
Eliminated jobs. Reinstatement may not be possible because the company
has ceased to exist, or the position has been eliminated. In Romania, the em-
ployee maintains his rights as if he had continued on the job. In Great Britain,
the employee must be indemnified for his losses. Moreover, where the employer
cites incompatibility as an obstacle to reinstatement, the employer must pay
twice the normal indemnification and give a 90 day prior notice to the worker.
Exercise of the right. In some countries, the employee may proceed to seek
reinstatement once there has been a decision that the discharge was unjustified
(Fed. Rep. Germany, Italy, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, Spain, and Sweden).
Other countries provide reinstatement as a judicially-imposed remedy, left to the
discretion of the judge, to be decided on a case-by-case basis (Brazil, Columbia,
Gr. Brit., India, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Norway, Turkey, and U.S.).
Option. There are countries that provide employers with the option of in-
demnification as an alternative to reinstatement (Gr. Brit., Italy, Sweden,
Spain). Although a discharged employee may have the right to be reinstated, he
may elect otherwise (Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Fed. Rep. Germany, and Italy).
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184. 224 Pa. 45, 73 A. 8, (1909). Trainer has never been overruled or cited by any
court. Its only reported recognition outside of its original publication appears in the Annotated
Law Reports. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1078, 1079 n.4 (1963).
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as well as on theories of promissory estoppel, reliance, oral promises
and corporate minutes. 187 Third, it affirms the applicability of "just
cause" standards to an employer's breach of an employment pol-
icy. 188 Therefore, following Trainer, Pennsylvania courts should
award reinstatement for breaches of employment policies.
IV. A "Fairness" Rationale In Employment Terminations: Limit-
ing the Reinstatement Remedy
The traditional at-will employment concept is changing rapidly.
Most jurisdictions have not circumscribed this relationship as drasti-
cally as California has done. 189 However, with the courts' increased
sympathy towards employees in these cases, employers should treat
terminations and other personnel decisions as potentially reviewable
under stringent standards. Even the non-union employer should view
each termination as if it were subject to labor arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement, i.e., subject to a "just cause" stan-
dard. In this way, the employer will better be able to defend its ac-
tions and minimize the chances of a reinstatement order.
Fair treatment of employees will also serve to minimize the risk.
Many employees bring suit because they believe they have been un-
fairly treated. Therefore, employers should attempt to soften the fi-
nancial and psychological effects of termination. For example, em-
ployers should avoid conduct which employees perceive as
187. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
188. See also Decker, Forgotten Case May be Key to At-Will Law, VII PA. L.J. -
RPTR. I (No. 32, August 20, 1984).
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839 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
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See generally, Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania, supra note 6. Today it is
more imperative than ever for employers to make a realistic examination of this area. The
surge of at-will employment litigation has not diminished. Instead, attorneys representing ter-
minated employees are constantly developing more novel theories with which to impose liabil-
ity on employers for wrongful terminations. See, e.g., Wainauski v. Howard Johnson Co., __
Pa. Super. -, 488 A.2d 1117 (1985) (malicious prosecution). Legislative regulation of this
area is all the more true today; i.e., that; "Instead of opposing legislation, the prudent em-
ployer should welcome a statutory scheme as providing an orderly legal remedy outside the
courtroom. The alternative involves the prospect of increased and costly litigation [for employ-
ers]. Terminated employees can be expected to litigate new fact situations concerning an em-
ployer's obligation to deal with employees fairly and in good faith." Decker, At-Will Employ-
ment in Pennsylvania, supra note 6 at 496.
The expense to employers of traditional litigation cannot be overemphasized. Traditional
litigation, including motions to dismiss, depositions, interrogatories, and lengthy discovery pro-
cedures is ill-suited to handling employee-terminations. The cost and delay at arriving at a
final result are unacceptable. Employers must have a relatively quick, inexpensive and binding
mechanism for dealing with such disputes. Arbitration, although not perfect, provides one solu-
tion. Arbitration serves as an alternative to traditional litigation of employee-terminations aris-
ing under a collective-bargaining agreement, and provides a binding resolution more quickly
and more inexpensively. See also Decker, supra note 6; Decker, Legislature, Not Courts
Should Change the At-Will Work Doctrine, 7 PA. L.J. RPTR, I (No. 28, July 16, 1984).
humiliating, such as public statements of displeasure with the em-
ployee's performance, or locking an employee out of the office. Em-
ployers should always treat their employees with dignity and respect.
Termination should not be the first course of action the em-
ployer undertakes. Even if the employer decides that a formal per-
formance-evaluation system is inappropriate, a progressive discipline
system warrants implementation. Under such a system the employer
would provide written warnings, direct the employee to acknowledge,
in writing, receipt of the warnings, and afford the employee opportu-
nities for rehabilitation. When an employer can document these ac-
tions, a court may be less likely to view the case in the employee's
favor and award reinstatement.
Internal grievance systems, if adopted, should be available to all
employees. If several employees commit the same offense, the em-
ployer should not discriminate in disciplining, absent strong business
reasons for the distinctions. In this area as well, detailed documenta-
tion of any disciplinary action will limit the probability of court-or-
dered reinstatements.
V. Conclusion
This article's examination of the reinstatement remedy does not
purport to offer the only, or necessarily the most preferable, method
of dealing with the subject. However, until the impact of the erosion
of the at-will employment relationship is finally assessed, employers
must remain attentive to the changes occuring in employment proce-
dures. Failure to do so may result in costly litigation and an in-
creased susceptibility to back-pay and reinstatement remedies.
Courts are increasingly finding that handbooks and employment
policies constitute binding employer commitments. Employees are
now requesting that courts treat the reinstatement as arbitrators
have under collective bargaining agreements. Employers can no
longer ignore these developments, and must prepare by realistically
reviewing their internal employment practices. If recent case law and
legislation are any indication, reinstatement is a remedy for an em-
ployer's breach of a handbook or an employment policy.

